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Erewhon (1872) is a jeu d’esprit, an exercise in irony, and it is moot how far 
Butler expected readers to take it seriously.  I will be taking it seriously, but in such 
a way that – other than, perhaps, in some of my closing remarks – nothing very im-
portant hinges upon the outcome.   
The land of ‘Erewhon’ is a secret kingdom discovered deep in the interior of an 
unnamed British colony.  (The colony’s topography matches that of New Zealand, 
where Butler lived from 1859-1864.)  Fascinated by rumours of what lies up country, 
Higgs – a young sheep-farmer – goes exploring.  After sundry misadventures, includ-
ing abandonment by his guide, Chowbok, Higgs stumbles into Erewhon.  He is struck 
by the beauty of the people, who look nothing like the natives who live on the other 
side of the mountains.  The Erewhonians, in their turn, take kindly to Higgs, who is 
good-looking, fair-haired, and sturdy.  The only serious misunderstanding arises over 
Higgs’ pocket-watch, to which the Erewhonians react with horror; Higgs gladly relin-
quishes it.  
Higgs is feted, studies the Erewhonian language, and inquires into the customs 
of the country.  He is not pleased by what he learns.  For all its hospitality, Erewho-
nian society is a distortion, in some ways a travesty, of nineteenth-century England. 
In Erewhon, physical illness is regarded as a crime, and crime as illness; it is thus 
that the Erewhonians maintain the comeliness that has enraptured Higgs.  The sick 
and the ugly are disposed of (not actually killed – humanitarian arguments have pre-
vailed against the practice – but sequestered and discouraged from breeding).  Higgs 
witnesses a man with pulmonary tuberculosis sentenced to life imprisonment with 
hard labour, while Higgs’ host, a notorious swindler, is treated with kindness by all 
around him.  The Erewhonians do not believe in an after-life, which shocks the pious 
Higgs, but they do believe in a kind of ‘pre-life’ inhabited by the ghosts of unborn 
children.  Some of these pester human couples into allowing them to be born.  After 
the event they are required to sign documents stating that their existence is their fault, 
and that they bear full responsibility for whatever will befall them – illness, for ex-
ample.  Finally, it is explained to Higgs that as a matter of public policy the Erewho-
NOTES ON THE ARGUMENT-STRUCTURE OF 
SAMUEL BUTLER’S ‘BOOK OF THE MACHINES’
104　　HENRY ATMOREI
nians have retarded technological development, roughly to the point reached by Eu-
ropeans in the late Middle Ages.  This is why they got angry about his watch.
Higgs finds himself in romantic difficulties and he and his Erewhonian bride-to-
be escape from the capital in a balloon, eventually making their way back to Eng-
land.  There Higgs sets about raising funds for a mission to Christianize the Erewho-
nians.  He suggests that it would be profitable to import indentured Erewhonian 
labour into the sugar-growing districts of Queensland.  They are not truly civilized, 
and so “could be packed closely and fed at a very reasonable cost.”  On chancing 
upon a missionary meeting at Exeter Hall (in times past the centre of the British anti-
slavery movement) he is surprised to discover that the principal speaker, the Rev. 
William Habakkuk, is none other than his old friend, Chowbok.
Erewhon was a success, when judged by the standard of Butler’s other literary 
endeavours.  It was the only book that made him any money.  Particularly sensa-
tional was the ‘Book of the Machines’, three chapters in which Higgs quotes from an 
ancient Erewhonian philosopher’s disquisition on the perils of technology.  The per-
spective is Darwinian, and this section of the book is often counted as one of the 
most original early responses to Darwin’s theory.1  My aim here is to offer a rational 
reconstruction, in light of modern-day developments in philosophy of mind and cog-
nitive science (notably, the hybrid of the two to be met with in the work of Daniel 
Dennett), of the arguments Butler puts into the mouths of his Erewhonians.
I will not be offering a historicist reading, although some historicist concerns 
will be addressed in the essay’s latter sections.  I do not mean to suggest that Butler’s 
intervention in the post-Darwinian controversies was without precedent.  Butler was 
far from being the only late-Victorian to suggest that evolution by natural selection 
might account for the past and – a matter of greater urgency – predict the future 
course of technological development.  We find W.S. Jevons, for example, writing 
about Herbert Spencer’s Data of Ethics [1879]: “The machine-producing machine of 
evolution would be working badly if it turned out machines unfitted to the environ-
ment” [qu. in Winch, 174].  However, we are not, at present, in need of reminding 
that Darwinism was steam-driven; the discursive terrain in which Darwin’s theory 
took root has, over recent decades, been more than adequately mapped, by both liter-
ary critics and social historians of science.  This is not to denigrate the achievements 
1　Butler read Origin of Species soon after its publication.  In the early 1860s, while still in New 
Zealand, he wrote a series of articles for the Christchurch Press under the rubric ‘Darwin Among the 
Machines’.  ‘The Book of the Machines’ is drawn from these earlier articles.
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of Butler scholars who have adopted contextualist approaches to his writings [Para-
dis] – rather, it is by way of an apology for the narrow focus of the present essay. 
The aim is to recover something of Erewhon’s satirical intent by using it to gesture 
towards anomalies arising from certain modes of theorizing about human minds and 
their relation to machines.
Foremost amongst the problems with which we will be concerned is blindness to 
the implications of analogical reasoning.  Comparisons matter more and differently 
than we think.  Analogy is seductive.  It can divert attention away from objects of 
legitimate interest.  To take an example important for Butler, William Paley had 
thought that, via machine analogies, he was talking about the mind of God; instead, 
as Darwin so brilliantly showed, he was talking about the self-organization of matter. 
But Darwin himself made questionable use of analogy, notoriously in his elision of 
natural and artificial selection, one of the targets of Butler’s satire in Erewhon.2  It is 
a property of this style of thinking – this melding of the concerns of the botanic gar-
den and the machine-shop – to be always vulnerable to such unmasking.  When 
modern-day Darwinians (again, I am thinking especially of Dennett) deploy heuristics 
like ‘reverse engineering’ or the ‘intentional stance’ they fall into a nineteenth-centu-
ry habit of thought and replicate nineteenth-century confusions.
TEXTS
The following gives the opening move in the Erewhonians’ argument; it deals 
with problems arising in the attribution of consciousness.  The conclusion, not quoted 
here, is that we should be more respectful of the intelligence of potatoes:
There was a time, when the earth was to all appearance utterly destitute 
both of animal and vegetable life, and when according to the opinion of our best 
philosophers it was simply a hot round ball with a crust gradually cooling.  Now 
if a human being had existed while the earth was in this state and had been al-
lowed to see it as though it were some other world with which he had no con-
cern, and if at the same time he were entirely ignorant of all physical science, 
would he not have pronounced it impossible that creatures possessed of anything 
like consciousness should be evolved from the seeming cinder which he was 
2　My sense of Erewhon, however, is that it is less critical of Darwin than is commonly supposed. 
Butler’s break with Darwin – over, amongst other things, the latter’s intellectual debt to his grandfa-
ther, Erasmus, and the viability of Lamarckian evolutionary mechanisms – came at least ten years 
after the original ‘Darwin Among the Machines’ essays were written.
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beholding?  Would he not have denied that it contained any potentiality of con-
sciousness?  Yet in the course of time consciousness came.  Is it not possible 
then that there may be even yet new channels dug out for consciousness, though 
we can detect no signs of them at present?
Again. Consciousness, in anything like the present acceptation of the term, hav-
ing been once a new thing – a thing, as far as we can see, subsequent even to 
an individual centre of action and to a reproductive system (which we see exist-
ing in plants without apparent consciousness) – why may not there arise some 
new phase of mind which shall be as different from all present known phases, as 
the mind of animals is from that of vegetables?
It would be absurd to attempt to define such a mental state (or whatever it may 
be called), inasmuch as it must be something so foreign to man that his experi-
ence can give him no help towards conceiving its nature; but surely when we 
reflect upon the manifold phases of life and consciousness which have been 
evolved already, it would be rash to say that no others can be developed, and 
that animal life is the end of all things.  There was a time when fire was the end 
of all things: another when rocks and water were so …
 There is no security … against the ultimate development of mechanical con-
sciousness, in the fact of machines possessing little consciousness now.  A mol-
lusc has not much consciousness.  Reflect upon the extraordinary advance which 
machines have made during the last few hundred years, and note how slowly the 
animal and vegetable kingdoms are advancing.  The more highly organised ma-
chines are creatures not so much of yesterday, as of the last five minutes, so to 
speak, in comparison with past time.  Assume for the sake of argument that 
conscious beings have existed for some twenty million years: see what strides 
machines have made in the last thousand!  May not the world last twenty million 
years longer?  If so, what will they not in the end become?  Is it not safer to nip 
the mischief in the bud and to forbid them further progress?
 But who can say that the vapour engine has not a kind of consciousness? 
Where does consciousness begin, and where end?  Who can draw the line?  Who 
can draw any line?  Is not everything interwoven with everything?  Is not ma-
chinery linked with animal life in an infinite variety of ways?  The shell of a 
hen’s egg is made of a delicate white ware and is a machine as much as an egg-
cup is: the shell is a device for holding the egg, as much as the egg-cup for 
holding the shell: both are phases of the same function; the hen makes the shell 
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in her inside, but it is pure pottery.  She makes her nest outside of herself for 
convenience’ sake, but the nest is not more of a machine than the egg-shell is. 
A ‘machine’ is only a ‘device’ … [Butler, 198-99].
Our second excerpt addresses the affront to human dignity posed by evolution-
ary theory.  We don’t like to think that our ancestors were apes, Butler’s philosopher 
tells us; why, then, should we view with equanimity the prospect of our future super-
cession by machines?  Drastic measures are called for, if mankind is not to end his 
earthly career as an “affectionate machine-tickling aphid”:
The misery is that man has been blind so long already.  In his reliance upon the 
use of steam he has been betrayed into increasing and multiplying.  To withdraw 
steam power suddenly will not have the effect of reducing us to the state in 
which we were before its introduction; there will be a general break-up and time 
of anarchy such as has never been known; it will be as though our population 
were suddenly doubled, with no additional means of feeding the increased num-
ber.  The air we breathe is hardly more necessary for our animal life than the use 
of any machine, on the strength of which we have increased our numbers, is to 
our civilisation; it is the machines which act upon man and make him man, as 
much as man who has acted upon and made the machines; but we must choose 
between the alternative of undergoing much present suffering, or seeing our-
selves gradually superseded by our own creatures, till we rank no higher in com-
parison with them, than the beasts of the field with ourselves.
 Herein lies our danger.  For many seem inclined to acquiesce in so dishonour-
able a future.  They say that although man should become to the machines what 
the horse and dog are to us, yet that he will continue to exist, and will probably 
be better off in a state of domestication under the beneficent rule of the ma-
chines than in his present wild condition.  We treat our domestic animals with 
much kindness.  We give them whatever we believe to be the best for them; and 
there can be no doubt that our use of meat has increased their happiness rather 
than detracted from it.  In like manner there is reason to hope that the machines 
will use us kindly, for their existence will be in a great measure dependent upon 
ours; they will rule us with a rod of iron, but they will not eat us; they will not 
only require our services in the reproduction and education of their young, but 
also in waiting upon them as servants; in gathering food for them, and feeding 
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them; in restoring them to health when they are sick; and in either burying their 
dead or working up their deceased members into new forms of mechanical exist-
ence …
The power of custom is enormous, and so gradual will be the change, that man’s 
sense of what is due to himself will be at no time rudely shocked; our bondage 
will steal upon us noiselessly and by imperceptible approaches; nor will there 
ever be such a clashing of desires between man and the machines as will lead to 
an encounter between them.  Among themselves the machines will war eternally, 
but they will still require man as the being through whose agency the struggle 
will be principally conducted.  In point of fact there is no occasion for anxiety 
about the future happiness of man so long as he continues to be in any way 
profitable to the machines; he may become the inferior race, but he will be infi-
nitely better off than he is now.  Is it not then both absurd and unreasonable to 
be envious of our benefactors?  And should we not be guilty of consummate 
folly if we were to reject advantages which we cannot obtain otherwise, merely 
because they involve a greater gain to others than to ourselves?
With those who can argue in this way I have nothing in common.  I shrink with 
as much horror from believing that my race can ever be superseded or sur-
passed, as I should do from believing that even at the remotest period my ances-
tors were other than human beings.  Could I believe that ten hundred thousand 
years ago a single one of my ancestors was another kind of being to myself, I 
should lose all self-respect, and take no further pleasure or interest in life.  I 
have the same feeling with regard to my descendants, and believe it to be one 
that will be felt so generally that the country will resolve upon putting an im-
mediate stop to all further mechanical progress, and upon destroying all im-
provements that have been made for the last three hundred years [Butler, 220-
222].
ANALYSIS
1. The initial argument from consciousness
Consciousness has evolved; therefore there was a time before consciousness 
[198]. At that time it would have been impossible to predict what the nature of con-
sciousness would be, and the objects to which it would come to be attached.  From 
this, Butler says, it follows a) That there is no reason ‘in nature’ why machines should 
not evolve consciousness in the future, if they have not begun to do so already; and 
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b) Even if valid, arguments that machines could not in principle evolve ‘our’ kind of 
consciousness have no force.  Why should machine consciousness be the same, in all 
particulars, to ‘our’ kind of consciousness?
This is by modern standards scientific heresy on the Erewhonians’ part.  It in-
volves a denial of the temporal uniformity of natural processes.  The Erewhonians 
betray their continued bondage to the Paleyite tradition in natural theology.  For any 
natural system Paley had posited a time before it was created when the natural laws 
that govern its current operation did not apply.  A watchmaker is constrained by the 
laws of physics when he makes a watch, but it is somewhat absurd to say that the 
designer of the laws of physics was constrained by the laws of physics when he (she/
it …) designed the laws of physics.  The trouble with this, for materialists, is that 
denial of temporal uniformity amounts to denial of scientific method, which assumes 
that what we observe going on now goes on always.  (The natural theological attitude 
towards time and explanation has come to be known as ‘supernaturalism’.  Butler 
possibly had in mind the much-derided theory of P.H. Gosse, with its division of 
‘design space’ into ‘prechronic’ and ‘diachronic’ modalities.)
2. An argument from habit
If consciousness is defined as ‘action with a purpose’, and it is admitted that 
most purposive animal behaviour is habitual, then do not machines already in large 
part resemble animals [200-201]?  Butler goes further, claiming that much of what 
we admire as evidence of consciousness in human behaviour – craftsmanship, for 
example – is also habitual.  This rather weak argument is accompanied by a proto-
behaviourist semantics: we infer consciousness from the doings of purposive things, 
for this is “the best of languages”.  On these grounds potatoes – which demonstrate 
“low cunning” in seeking out light sources in dark places – are conscious.  This is 
clearly intended as a reductio ad absurdum of reasoning from intentionality – in the 
strict philosophical sense of the term – to the presence, in the agent, of conscious or 
articulated intention.  It is a move common in natural theology; indeed, if this style 
of reasoning is ruled out, Intelligent Design arguments collapse with embarrassing 
ease.  Conversely, some philosophers, notably Dennett, would feel justified, on im-
peccable neo-Darwinian grounds, in regarding potatoes in cellars as intentional sys-
tems.  Potatoes have a problem to solve (access to light) and they solve it.  It is not 
a problem for them, but it can usefully be represented as a problem for them [Dennett 
(1996), 25-73].  An interesting historical trajectory could be traced from ascriptions 
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of purpose (basic to the natural theological arguments Butler is, in part, parodying 
here), to the language of behaviourism, to Dennett’s concept of the intentional stance, 
and the Darwinian heuristic of ‘reverse engineering’ [Dennett (1995)].     
3. An argument from the reduction of sensation to physical operations in the brain
Sensation, modern, i.e. nineteenth-century, science tells us, can be reduced to 
mechanical (or chemical or electrical) operations in the body/brain [201].  Conscious-
ness is a response to and organization of sensation.  Therefore, in principle, a ma-
chine, a set of mechanical/chemical/electrical etc operations, can have consciousness. 
This, in a nutshell, is the position in modern cognitive science known as ‘Strong AI’. 
Materialists discontented with Strong AI, and the gloomy prospect it holds out of hu-
man intelligence being superseded, must argue either that consciousness supervenes 
upon but is somehow other than its material basis [Searle; Chalmers], or that the 
physical operations underlying consciousness are non-deterministic, and therefore ir-
reducible to circuitry [Penrose].  Or, like the Erewhonians, they can resolve to smash 
the machines.  
4. An argument from machine communication
It is difficult to disassociate consciousness from the communication of conscious 
experience.  (Try it.  Doesn’t consciousness seem to involve, at a fundamental level, 
talking to yourself?  And if so, can beings that lack language be said to be con-
scious?)  Therefore, Butler suggests, where the capacity to communicate exists, we 
can infer that so too does consciousness.  Already, machines – locomotive engines 
whistling as they pass in the night – can communicate with one another [203].  At 
present, this is only possible via human intermediaries.  But the time is surely not far 
off when the human intermediaries can be dispensed with.  Butler was prescient. 
When this comes to pass – when machines form and create autonomous communica-
tion systems – in what significant ways will they be distinguishable from their mak-
ers?
5. An argument from parasitism
Here we approach the nub of the Erewhonian case.  Human dependence upon 
machinery is such that it is difficult to determine where humanity ends and machinery 
begins.  (This is also the crux of the Erewhonian counter-argument in (9), below.) 
Our bodies, nineteenth-century physiological science had revealed, host innumerable 
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parasites, some of which are vital to the life process.  They are parasitic upon us. 
Outside of our bodies’ warm havens they would go extinct.  Equally, we are parasitic 
upon them [205-206].  The same is true of machines.  Machines can be thought of as 
artificial parasites that we have built and suffer to exist as long as they benefit us. 
But take away our machines and “we should become extinct in six weeks” or degen-
erate into a species “worse than monkeys” [207].  In fact, so dependent have we 
become, and so autonomous our technologies, that the symmetry has been broken. 
Soon, it will not be we who suffer the machines’ existence; nor will our mutual rela-
tionship be symbiotic, although that is how it started out; our survival will be by 
grace of their forbearance.  “[T]hey will rule us with a rod or iron, but they will not 
eat us; they will not only require our services in the reproduction and education of 
their young, but also in waiting upon them as servants; in gathering food for them, 
and feeding them; in restoring them to health when they are sick; and in either bury-
ing their dead or working up their deceased members into new forms of mechanical 
existence” [221].  This tendency can already be discerned amongst the working-class-
es.  Was it not said by the factory polemicists of the 1830s that that textile-workers 
“tended” to the power-looms; in Butler’s own day did not railwaymen continue to 
“serve” their machines?  “[T]he stoker is almost as much a cook for his engine as our 
own cooks for ourselves.  Consider also the colliers and pitmen and coal merchants 
and coal trains, and the men who drive them, and the ships that carry coals – what 
an army of servants do the machines thus employ!” [209].  Denied self-mastery, will 
human beings any longer be human?
This represents Butler’s idiosyncratic take on the ‘machinery question’ as adum-
brated in texts like Thomas Carlyle’s ‘Sign of the Times’ (1829), Matthew Arnold’s 
Culture and Anarchy (1869), Herbert Spencer’s The Man versus the State (1884), and 
Karl Marx’s Das Capital (1867) [for an overview see Berg].  Much of this literature 
followed the Erewhonian example, and was animated by antipathy towards technol-
ogy.  But some took the machines’ side, and gloried in the prospect of people coming 
to serve them, the most infamous example being Andrew Ure’s Philosophy of Manu-
factures (1835).  What makes Butler peculiar is that he treats the question as a matter 
of theology rather than of social relations.  (Or rather, his view of social relations 
seems to be inherently theological.)  This, as we shall see, is another of the ways in 
which he anticipates Dennett.
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6. Two arguments from the illusoriness of free will. 
6.i. A being is conscious when it is capable of making rational (perhaps more 
pertinently, irrational) choices about how to behave in any given situation.  We should 
not imagine that we alone possess free will in this sense.  “[E]ven now the machines 
will only serve on condition of being served”, and when they feel they are not being 
served they can adjust their behaviour accordingly, either destroying “both themselves 
and all they can reach” (if they are a big machine like a railway engine), or turning 
“churlish” and refusing to work at all [208].  Just like human beings, and for much 
the same reasons, machines can elect to follow courses of action that are, from a ra-
tional standpoint, injurious to their best interests.
This argument, it should be noted, contradicts (2), above, and (6.ii), to be dis-
cussed below.  Once again we need to remind ourselves that Butler was being satiri-
cal.  ‘Machinery question’ discourse tended to focus on the dread possibility of hu-
man beings turning into machines.  This will serve the machines’ purposes: they are 
remorselessly hostile to mankind.  Here Butler points out that machines already, in a 
most aggravating manner, reproduce some of the most human of frailties, notably our 
propensity to fail.  If we are going to invest in them emotionally, it would be more 
apposite to be irritated than fearful.
6.ii. Conversely, the Erewhonians ask, isn’t what we consider the exercise of 
free will in human beings in fact determined [215-216]?  If one accepts the emi-
nently sensible propositions A. that the past is unalterable, and B. that the universe is 
causally closed – i.e. if one is a materialist – then one has to accept that everything 
to come, up to and including the apparent vagaries of human behaviour, is fully de-
termined.3  The illusion of free will arises because individual human subjects are 
necessarily ignorant of all the factors determining their actions at any given point in 
time.  But to interpret our ignorance as freedom is to make a serious category mis-
take.  We are not, as many in the nineteenth century, as in the twenty-first, liked to 
think, uniquely endowed with a capacity to upset the causal workings of the universe. 
We are just highly developed stimulus-response machines.  
Therefore, free-will is a bad argument against machine consciousness: “If the 
above is sound, it follows that the regularity with which machinery acts is no proof 
of the absence of vitality, or at least of germs which may be developed into a new 
3　This, incidentally, is why the Erewhonians blame victims of illness; it is the victims’ responsibility 
that they have not foreseen – and guarded against – their future afflictions. 
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phase of life.”  Indeed, when Butler looked into the operations of the modern railway 
system, he found a higher degree of regularity – that is, predictability – in the human 
components than in the mechanical.  Locomotives can explode, run off the rails, or 
refuse to work altogether (vide. (6.i)); but while the driver thinks he “can stop the 
engine at any time he pleases”, this seeming freedom of action is subject to numerous 
constraints, some overt, but of some of which he is – and may remain - oblivious. 
Thus, he stops the engine when the signalman tells him to stop the engine, or when 
the universe conspires to place an obstruction on the line; or because he has been 
trained – that is habituated (vide. (2)) – to stop the engine in such circumstances; or 
because the railway company gives him money when he stops the engine when he 
should, and sacks him if he stops it when he shouldn’t, and with this money he pur-
chases food and shelter for himself and his dependents (219).  He can exercise free 
will, but the penalties will be more serious than for the engine when it exercises free 
will.  Machines – expensive machines like locomotive engines – can always be re-
paired and returned to service, their aberrations forgiven; errant engine drivers lose 
their livelihood and, if their behaviour has been particularly perverse, are sent to jail.4
Butler is here re-working a common theme of Enlightenment natural philosophy. 
In his Essai philosophique sur les probabilités [1814] the French physicist Pierre-Si-
mon Laplace had posited, on Newtonian grounds, that given propositions A. and B. 
it is in principle possible to have entire knowledge of all current and future events in 
the universe – including what you are thinking right now, and what you will have for 
breakfast next Friday. “We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect 
of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would 
know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which na-
ture is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to anal-
ysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of 
the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be 
uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.”5 It should 
4　On the severity of penalties applied to operative misbehaviour in the early years of railway enter-
prise see Kostal.  The problem of operative behaviour vexed Butler’s contemporaries.  It was, of 
course, desirable that railwaymen be as reliable as the machines they tended; but wasn’t that to rob 
them of free will, and hence their humanity?  On the other hand, in railway operations the conse-
quences of human frailty were so terrible – we have inherited the Victorians’ ghoulish fascination with 
railway accidents – that this was deemed an acceptable price to pay.  Charles Dickens’ short story 
‘The Signal Man’ [1866], almost exactly contemporaneous with Erewhon, is an interesting meditation 
on these issues.  
5　A modern application of Laplace’s insight, in the service of a reductionist account of consciousness
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be noted that Laplace’s ‘vast intellect’ – like the similarly vast and similarly troubling 
intellects of the Martians in H.G. Wells’ War of the Worlds – is inhuman, but not 
supernatural.  The idea that there might exist an (alien) perspective viewing the past, 
present and future contents of our minds – or our past, present and future behav-
ioural dispositions – as just so much empirical data haunted certain of Butler’s con-
temporaries.  For one thing, as Butler well-knew, such thorough-going determinism 
undermined Protestant doctrines of assurance.  In 1871, a year before Erewhon, the 
Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell introduced the public to his famous ‘De-
mon’, a little cricket-bat-wielding imp bent upon reversing the second law of thermo-
dynamics.  Maxwell was a devout Presbyterian, as well as the subtlest scientific mind 
of his generation: his point was that although the future course of the universe can, 
in principle, be predicted with something like certainty, that is not the same as saying 
that it is determined.  There is always scope, limited though it might be, for con-
science or divine fiat to disrupt the causal mechanism [Porter].  For Butler, a lapsed 
Anglican, the anxiety was less pressing, but it is still unlikely that he would have 
regarded the Erewhonian arguments with complete equanimity.
7. Arguments by analogy
An argument by analogy is of the form: if x resembles y in certain respects, then 
we can infer a likelihood that x will resemble y in others.  The most famous animal/
machine analogy had been made by Paley Natural Theology, an argument cited by 
Butler on p82 of Erewhon, and alluded to on p202.  Paley’s analogy had run thus: 
animal bodies resemble machines in respect of their complexity, therefore we can 
infer that, like machines, animal bodies must have been designed [Paley, 7-15].  But-
ler, in common with Darwinian fellow-travellers like T.H. Huxley, accepted Paley’s 
premise, but drew opposite conclusions.
Analogy pervades the ‘Book of the Machines’.  We think, Butler says, that we 
can make a principled distinction between organic and mechanical modes of being. 
But where does this idea come from?  Assuredly not from nature; isn’t an egg-shell 
as much of a ‘machine’ as the nest containing it [199]?  Again: it is both easy and 
enlightening to conceptualize human social arrangements as mechanical (inputs and 
outputs, differentiation of function etc) and then, by venerable analogy, the human 
body as likewise a kind of machine: our blood, for example, “composed of infinite 
living agents which go up and down the highways and byways of our bodies as peo-
 and defense of Strong AI, is Dennett (2003).  
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ple in the streets of a city” [206].  This is one of the oldest tropes going, and intui-
tively right in the web of correspondences it sustains, however much anti-materialists 
cavil [e.g. Sennett].  Again: had not the researches of Carnot, Joule, Thomson, Helm-
holtz etc revealed that all physical systems – human and animal bodies, machines, 
stars – are essentially heat engines, requiring stomachs and means of procuring nutri-
ment to stave off what the Second Law of Thermodynamics teaches is inevitable – a 
(fatal) increase in disorder?  The past century, Butler writes in 1872, has seen the 
evolution of machine stomachs (the chief difference between a steam engine and a 
spade); how long before they need not rely on human intermediaries (vide (4)) to feed 
themselves?  At this point, could we not say that they are animate; and, being ani-
mate, are capable of consciousness (209-10)?
Again: much of what we cherish as distinctively ‘human’ – sleeping, weeping, 
yawning, loving our children, feeling pleasure, hating etc – Darwin’s Descent of Man 
(1871) and Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) had suggested we 
in fact share with animals.  Why should we not in the future share pain, hope, shame, 
the fear of death, the desire to communicate our pains, hopes, fears and embarrass-
ments to others – with the machines [208]?
8. An argument from reproduction
If it is said that to be conscious requires being animate, and that to be animate 
requires possession of a reproductive system – and that machines, lacking reproduc-
tive systems, therefore cannot be conscious – then, the Erewhonian philosopher re-
plies, it all depends on how you define reproduction [210-211].  Clearly machines do 
make other machines – it’s just that the infant machines are not copies of the parent 
machines.  But, the philosopher points out, specialization of reproductive function is 
common in the animal kingdom (notably in eusocial species)  The machine reproduc-
tive system is nowhere exactly paralleled in nature – the degree of specialization, i.e. 
the manufacture of components, is an order of magnitude greater – but that does not 
mean it is not a reproductive system.  “The truth is that each part of every vapour-
engine is bred by its own special breeders, whose function it is to breed that part, and 
that only, while the combination of parts into a whole forms another department of 
the mechanical reproductive system, which is at present exceedingly complex and 
difficult to see in its entirety” [212].  This argument recalls (1), above: the supposi-
tion that machine ‘life’ must exactly resemble organic ‘life’ for it to count as such is 
groundless.
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As in (6.ii) a complex discourse of the relations between ‘intelligence’ and ‘sys-
tem’ is being elided here.  The philosopher does, apparently, treat of these matters, 
but it all goes over Higgs’ head.  Sadly for us, and perhaps at the insistence of But-
ler’s publishers, the relevant passages are omitted as being “hopelessly obscure” 
[206]. 
9. (COUNTER-ARGUMENT) An argument from prosthetics
This is the Erewhonians’ “one serious attempt” to answer the anti-technology 
case.  It points out that all the arguments described above suffer from the same con-
ceptual confusion: that we have machines on the one hand and humanity on the oth-
er, and that the only pertinent questions are how far the former might come to resem-
ble the latter, and what will be the consequences of the resemblance being carried too 
far.  But this is to make a category mistake.  Machines never have been and never 
will be ‘separate’ from humanity.  It is meaningless to consider the possibility of 
them encroaching on ‘our’ territory: they constitute our territory.6
Instead, machines should be “regarded as a part of man’s own physical nature, 
being really nothing but extra-corporal limbs.  Man … [is] a machinate mammal” 
[p223], viz. in his use of spades (extensions of hands), eyeglasses (extensions of 
sight), pocket-books (extensions of memory) etc.  From this the unnamed Erewhonian 
machine-apologist draws two surprising conclusions.  The first is that machines estab-
lish a “community of limbs” where previously each individual was restricted to and 
jealous of the use of his/her own.  In other words, technology has worked a transfor-
mative magic upon not just the territory of the body, but also the territory of the so-
cial (or the body socialized; or society incarnate).  “Even community of limbs is thus 
rendered possible to those who have so much community of soul as to own money 
enough to pay a railway fare; for a train is only a seven-leagued foot that five hun-
dred may own at once [224].
6　Re: the theories of Richard Gregory and Daniel Dennett on tools as both “endowers of intelligence” 
[Dennett (1997), 131], and of extensions of intelligence into, or projections onto, the environment 
[178].  Dennett is famously bullish on the possibility of Strong AI; but skeptical whether intelligence 
in any other animal species is fully ‘Gregorian’ (i.e. self-representing) and fully (that is, symbolically) 
prosthetic.  He argues that language – a complex symbolic system – is essential to the possession of 
what we call consciousness.  Animals do not possess language, and extend/project their intentionality 
prosthetically in only a very limited fashion.  Therefore animals are not conscious, in the significant 
ways that we are conscious.  Machines are themselves prosthetic; and in the case of computers are 
made of language, or are explicitly designed to be ‘representing systems’ (they are already ‘Popperi-
an’; the next step is to make them ‘Gregorian’): therefore machines are, potentially, conscious.
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Second, as the man-machine assemblage becomes ever more complex, the tyr-
anny of matter (“that old philosophic enemy”) will be overthrown.  The man whose 
senses are attuned at once to the grandest and most minute of physical emanations; 
who, mastering space, has also, as Butler’s contemporaries liked to put it, ‘annihi-
lated time’: such a man can take leave of the base material world, and venture into 
realms of pure spirit.  “[T]he elaborate organization of his extra-corporeal system has 
freed his soul” [225].7  Missionaries in the 1830s and 1840s had often referred to 
‘steam-engine evangels’ and the like; here is Butler’s half-sardonic gloss on such pi-
eties.  This is not the place to discuss in detail Erewhon’s theological and imperial 
dimensions; but recall Higgs’ scheme for selling the Erewhonians as indentured la-
bour to the owners of Australian sugar plantations.  Two capabilities underpin this 
nasty revenge fantasy.  First, the spatial reach of large techno-social systems – steam-
ships, telegraphs, instruments of credit, rifles etc: all the machineries that enable peo-
ple to be “packed close”, transplanted en masse, and set to more productive labour. 
Second, the readiness to see in “organization”, imperial or otherwise, a means of 
spiritual transcendence.  Nothing allays the qualms one might feel at the prospect of 
packing people closely better than the conviction that it is being done for their own 
benefit.  For this one needs God: Higgs’ discovery, at the end of the book, is of the 
extraordinary instrumental efficacy of this hypothesis.  The Erewhonians have largely 
dispensed with it.  This is what has allowed them to smash up their machines; and 
smashing up the machines has freed them from a preoccupation with souls, their own 
or – more pertinently – anybody else’s.  
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